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“I continuously go further and further learning about
my own limitations, my body limitation, psychological
limitations. It’s a way of life for me.” (Ayrton Senna).
ABSTRACT
Psychology and neuroscience literature shows the existance of up-
per bounds on the human capacity for executing cognitive tasks
and for information processing. These bounds are where, demon-
strably, people start experiencing cognitive strain and consequently
committing errors in the tasks execution. We argue that the usable
security discipline should scientifically understand such bounds in
order to have realistic expectations about what people can or can-
not attain when coping with security tasks. This may shed light
on whether Johnny will be ever be able to encrypt. We propose a
conceptual framework for evaluation of human capacities in secu-
rity that also assigns systems to complexity categories according
to their security and usability. From what we have initiated in this
paper, we ultimately aim at providing designers of security mech-
anisms and policies with the ability to say: “This feature of the
security mechanism X or this security policy element Y is inappro-
priate, because this evidence shows that it is beyond the capacity
of its target community".
CCS Concepts
•Security and privacy→ Usability in security and privacy;
Keywords
Usable security models, human capacities.
1. INTRODUCTION
∗Authors listed in alphabetic order of last names.
A version of this paper appeared in NSPW ’15 Proceedings of the 2015 New Security
Paradigms Workshop.
Usable security as a discipline is almost twenty years old – or
older if one considers the principles A. Kerckhoffs wrote in 1883 in
La cryptographie militaire [42] as the first usable security statement
– and still Johnny cannot encrypt.
In the modern literature the earliest conceptual paper on usable
security is that of Zurko and Simon, published in NSPW 1996 [92].
It discusses the necessity of psychological acceptability1, summa-
rises the scarce usable security research at that time, and points out
design directions for user-centred security mechanisms. Since then,
many works have investigated usable security. In 2005, Cranor and
Garfinkel [23] edited the “Security and Usability”, an omnibus vol-
ume collecting work done in the field up to that time. In the same
year Zurko [91] discussed the many open problems (and some so-
lutions) in usable security and formulated the grand challenge of
the field: “Give all users (including developers, administrators,
and end-users) security controls that protect them, their systems,
and their privacy, that they can use appropriately in the dynamic,
pervasive computing environments of the present and the future.”
Almost 10 years have passed since this challenge was stated, and
still successes in usable security are not being seen on a large scale.
As Herley puts it [36]: “While usable security has had many suc-
cesses in pointing out the failings of security UI, progress has been
slower at providing actionable alternatives.”
Considering the works published in the last year (2014), we can
see that Johnny still cannot encrypt [69], choose strong passwords
[44, 79], comply with browser warnings [28], identify suspicious
links in messages [8,17], learn from security training [17], or write
secure software [57]. That Johnny is so “inept” with security tech-
nology frustrates the security community. One wonders whether
the community is lacking the required inventive spark to develop
solutions that can help Johnny, or whether there is something in-
trinsically difficult that prevents Johnny from performing security
tasks as expected by those who design them, be they usable security
researchers or security practitioners.
Perhaps it is this intrinsic difficulty that leads researchers and
Johnnys alike into a spiral of frustration and blame: Researchers,
1Psychological acceptability is a term coined in 1975 in Saltzer
and Schroeder’s classic paper on design principles for secure sys-
tems [72]: “It is essential that the human interface be designed
for ease of use, so that users routinely and automatically apply the
protection mechanisms correctly. Also, to the extent that the user’s
mental image of his protection goals matches the mechanisms he
must use, mistakes will be minimised. If he must translate his im-
age of his protection needs into a radically different specification
language, he will make errors.”
unable to influence Johnny’s secure behaviour, label him “the weak-
est link of the security chain”; Johnny, annoyed by the excessive
security demands in his way, calls them “security paranoids”, since
they don’t realise that as much as he values security, he needs to
send that email whether it is encrypted or not. To develop a health-
ier approach to the problem, it seems time for researchers to ask the
question: Is usable security possible for all tasks?
1.1 Respecting Human Capacities
Development of security mechanisms and policies for the gen-
eral public and employees in corporations alike currently happens
in a way that relies on “best practices” rather than on scientific ev-
idence [80]. This can result in mechanisms and policies that are
beyond capacity of people, that is, beyond their ability, experience,
or understanding. Such mechanisms disregard fundamental princi-
ples of how people function, what they might reasonably refuse to
do, and what they are physically and mentally able to achieve.
The technical security community historically thinks that it is
the responsibility of users to operate at the capacity required by
a security mechanism. If the corresponding security requirements
are not achieved, it is seen as the fault of the users.
The usable security community, in contrast, argues that secu-
rity requirements can be met through careful design of usable se-
curity solutions. For example, in a recent paper [62] leveraging
behavioural science to mitigate security risks, Pfleeger and Caputo
argue that “if humans using computer systems are given the tools
and information they need, taught the meaning of responsible use,
and then trusted to behave appropriately with respect to cyber se-
curity, desired outcomes may be obtained without security’s being
perceived as onerous or burdensome”. If the corresponding secu-
rity requirements are not achieved, the usable security community
tends to attribute this to the failure of the security designers.
The position of both communities needs to converge. The tech-
nical security community has to acknowledge what the usable se-
curity research tells us about human interaction with security tech-
nology; the usable security community has to review its approach,
because providing tools and information help little if we overlook
whether people is being asked to execute tasks beyond their capac-
ity. For example, it seems that, on average, no amount of advice on
the personal use of passwords will enable people to maintain unique
random passwords for a typically large number of accounts [10,30]:
although password management tools could help, such usable tools
are rare and user acceptance of these tools is low [54].
Although evidence of other infeasible tasks is yet to be devel-
oped, we think that various unusable security solutions hint at their
existence. Consequently, we propose to investigate which security
tasks are within or beyond the capacity of their intended users. For
example, trained users can encrypt their emails while the general
Internet population cannot – this may be because understanding
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) well enough to be able to exchange
encrypted emails would require a critically large part of the Internet
population to become fully-fledged security experts.
There are at least two advantages in determining which tasks are
beyond capacity of users. First, one could substitute an infeasi-
ble task with a task that ensures the same level of security but is
within capacity. Second, one could help users to perform the tasks,
for instance by supporting them with mnemonic techniques, with
complementary security technologies, or with training. We note,
however, that also the feasibility of these additional measures have
to be examined. Whichever way one chooses, if users are alleviated
from executing security tasks beyond their capacities, they will per-
ceive less burden and be more willing to act securely [4].
We give two examples of such benefits. If we could gather reli-
able scientific evidence that, for example, a typical home computer
user is not able to understand PKI-based systems to the extent re-
quired for execution of the corresponding tasks, the users will not
be blamed for not encrypting their emails or for not complying with
SSL certificate warnings (if this has been determined to be an ap-
propriate task for end-users to enact). In this case, with knowledge
of the human capacity to approach the task, the security community
will have additional motivation and evidence to redesign the corre-
sponding systems to achieve more consistent outcomes. In the case
of spear phishing emails, if there was an upper bound to an indi-
vidual’s ability to detect deceptive elements in emails, then a good
strategy would be to develop and adopt other security mechanisms.
1.2 Measuring Complexity of Usable Security
To tackle the problem of user capacities in a way that is fair to
both users and designers, we need to approach the question in a
structured manner. Our goal is to understand which tasks are so dif-
ficult for the users as to be considered beyond their capacity. This
effort will help us identify upper bounds on the level of usability
achievable by a system containing such tasks.
This way of reasoning is similar to the evaluation of time and
space complexity of algorithms in the complexity theory [21]. By
measuring an algorithm’s complexity and by observing that expo-
nential-time procedures are inefficient, one can objectively predict
the algorithm’s performance and the size of problems one can ef-
fectively solve using it. We do not aim at setting up a mathemati-
cal complexity framework in usable security; we do not think that
people can be treated in the same way as Turing machines. How-
ever, having an estimation of task complexity in terms of human
resources will help establish evidence-based expectations on the
effective usability of a system.
There are three points to discuss if we intend to hold the analogy
between algorithm complexity and system usability. We need to es-
tablish (1) a model of computation, (2) a measure of computational
complexity, and (3) a notion of intractability [31, 59].
1. The model of computation in usable security is the intended user
as a representative of a group of users with specific cognitive
and physical abilities. Here, we also consider that humans can
augment their natural capacities. For instance, they can use a
memory device such as a mental story-board to memorise more
things, a USB-token to hold a password, or they can rely on
transactive memory [86] when working in groups. In such cases,
our model of computation is the human and the device or the
group of humans, since these are the entities that execute tasks.
2. A measure of computational complexity is the amount of inter-
nal resources a human spends to execute a security task, that is,
the required physical and cognitive effort.
3. When the demands of a task exceed human capacities, people
experience strain, which can lead to mistakes or abandonment
of the task. This could be a definition of intractability, mean-
ing that a task, because of its cognitive or physical demands, is
“beyond human capacity”. Note that we may be unable to as-
sess a task’s complexity if we have not enough evidence to draw
reliable conclusions.
We are interested in clarifying the implications of “usability com-
plexity” for the overall usable security of a system. In Section 6
we propose and discuss a conceptual framework that distinguishes
different degrees of usable security in terms of two variables, “us-
ability” and “security”. The framework relies on (a) a measure of
a system’s usability in terms of “tasks within” and “tasks beyond”
user capacity and (b) an assessment of a system’s security in terms
of satisfied requirements. We are aware that these measures of us-
ability and security are very coarse-grained and need to be refined
in the future; hoever, even so, they suffice to provide a clear pre-
liminary classification of systems in terms of their usable security.
We can now formulate our research question as follows: In us-
able security, can we determine whether security tasks are within
capacity, and which security tasks are beyond capacity?
Before considering that what we can do if we knew that tasks
are within or beyond capacity, we should provide evidence that hu-
man capacities for security-related tasks can be measured after all.
We intend to call on outputs from other research areas and to sys-
tematically apply them to the security domain. For example, neu-
roscience research [75] has documented for decades the features
of human memory in forgetting (omission) and distorting (com-
mission) facts. Psychologists have known for decades that humans
behave like communication channels [55], as much as the chan-
nels in Shannon’s information theory [78], and that they can, on
average, transmit reliably and without “getting confused”, only 2.5
bits, which corresponds to approximately 7 chunks of information.
All these results are based on experimental evidence, meaning that
human capacities can be measured in these disciplines.
Contribution.
This paper makes the following contributions:
1. It introduces a new paradigm of considering usable security from
the task complexity point of view, acknowledging the existence
of intractable and hard tasks in terms of human cognitive and
physical capacities.
2. It proposes an ECG (electrocardiogram)-based methodology for
measuring human capacities, which can be refined and used to
catalogue capacities for common security tasks.
3. It proposes a framework with definitions of complexity cate-
gories for usable security. The framework is expected to be
refined in future work with the help of the community of re-
searchers and practitioners.
This paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the notion
of usable security. Section 3 presents examples of human capaci-
ties from a psychology and neuroscience viewpoint. In Section 4
we provide examples of complexities for security tasks, specifically
password authentication, USB security, and email encryption. Sec-
tion 5 discusses an ECG-based methodology for measuring human
capacities for security tasks. Section 6 presents an initial frame-
work for complexity of usable security. Section 7 discusses our
ideas in the light of related work. In Section 8 we present our con-
cluding remarks and future work.
2. USABLE SECURITY
In this section, we clarify our working definition of “usable se-
curity”, as there seems to be no unified definition in the commu-
nity. For example, a recent book by Garfinkel and Lipford [32],
summarising research in usable security from the very beginning
to 2014, provides definitions for security and for usability, but does
not define the term “usable security” per se.
Meanwhile, as widely acknowledged in the community, usable
security is not just the union of the definitions of its separate parts,
security and usability [46,48,74,81,85]. It requires a careful adap-
tation of the usability concept to the security domain, as discussed
by Whitten and Tygar in their classical work on usable email en-
cryption [87]: “Usability necessarily has different meanings in dif-
ferent contexts. [. . . ] In a security context, our priorities must be
whatever is needed in order for the security to be used effectively”.
In Section 2.1 we define usability and consider the implications
of this definition for the security domain; then, in Section 2.2, we
discuss the role of usability in achieving security. These consider-
ations are later reflected in the usability measurement framework
presented in Section 5 and in the complexity framework for usable
security in Section 6.
2.1 Defining Usability of Security
Although many classical definitions of usability exist, for the
purpose of this work we consider the ISO 9241-11 definition [38]:
Extent to which a product can be used by specified users to achieve
specified goals with effectiveness, efficiency and satisfaction in a
specified context of use.
The advantage of the ISO definition is its operationality, as it
tells us how to test the usability of a product: we first should specify
users, their goals, tasks and context of use, and then test the task ex-
ecution for effectiveness, efficiency and satisfaction. We note that
although satisfaction can only be tested with the intended users, ef-
fectiveness and efficiency can be also tested without involving the
users, e.g., using cognitive walkthroughs, heuristic usability evalu-
ation or GOMS modelling [56, 88].
With a definition of usability, we next explore questions that arise
when applying this definition to security systematising similar con-
siderations previously made by various authors [46,48,74,81,85].
Notable stumbling blocks in the ISO definition are the notions of
“product” and “goals”. Security measures are rarely a stand-alone
product, rather they are integrated into a system with the goal of
protecting the system and its users from attacks. For example, clas-
sical protection goals are confidentiality, integrity and availability
of data and other resources. Moreover, security goals are usually
not primary, but secondary goals of the user.
For example, the primary goal of sending an encrypted email
is communication, and the secondary goal is confidentiality. The
product is an email client with an integrated email encryption ca-
pability. Can (and should) the usability of the email client be eval-
uated separately from the usability of the email encryption func-
tionality? Is the user always able to determine whether the goal of
encryption is achieved? When encryption software fails, this fail-
ure is often not visible [32, p. 55].
The authentication service of a bank’s online portal is a very im-
portant protection measure for its customers, and should be effec-
tive and efficient. However, what about satisfaction? Should cus-
tomers be satisfied with a two-factor authentication mechanism that
delays their primary task of making a money transfer, however easy
the mechanism might be to use? In this sense, rather than satisfac-
tion, minimal dissatisfaction is a more realistic positive outcome.
The question of handling errors is also not straightforward. If
confidentiality should be maintained, an error that exposes the se-
cret to the attacker cannot be “corrected” anymore (Whitten and
Tygar [87] call this the “barn door property”).
Moreover, as the security protection tasks often do not serve the
primary goals of the users, usability evaluations should consider
users in the accomplishment of their primary tasks in the context
that is natural for the system usage.
Finally, context of use in the security domain also includes the
attacker. Garfinkel and Lipford [32] formulated attacker modelling
in usable security as one of the most important research challenges
in the usability evaluation of security and privacy measures. The
many questions that arise are e.g., how to account for attacks in
evaluation methods, how to choose which attacks to include, how
to approach the ethical side of user tests involving attacks and de-
ception, and how to manage the validity of the results of user tests
(e.g., whether users be more or less vigilant in a test environment).
Thus, although the usability of security may be defined using the
same words as in the above ISO 9241-11 definition, some of these
words might have different or additional meaning:
Usability of a security mechanism or policy is the extent to which
this mechanism or policy can be used by specified users to achieve
the specified security goals (some of these goals being invisible or
secondary goals to the users) and the specified primary goals with
effectiveness, efficiency and satisfaction (or at least with low dissat-
isfaction) during the execution of the specified primary user tasks
in a specified context of use (including the specified attacks).
We use this definition in Section 5 when presenting a usability
measurement framework, and in Section 6 when presenting a com-
plexity framework for usable security.
2.2 Relationship of Usability and Security
In 2004, an influential article by Avizienis et al. [2] unified the
basic concepts of dependability and security with the goal to facil-
itate communication and cooperation between the corresponding
research communities. The authors position dependability and se-
curity as fundamental non-functional system properties alongside
the functional properties of functionality and performance.
In particular, dependability is described as a concept integrating
safety as an important attribute, where safety is defined as the ab-
sence of catastrophic consequences on the user(s) and the environ-
ment [2, p. 13]. Security is defined as the absence of unauthorised
access to, or handling of, system state [2, p. 23].
The similarities between security and safety have been exam-
ined by the usable security community [15]. In particular, different
methods of usability analysis constitute important techniques for
assuring safety of critical systems. Revisiting the role of termi-
nology, we note that the term “usable safety” does not exist, and
other terms, e.g., “human factors” or “human error”, are used in-
stead in the field of safety [19, 67, 88]. It seems that usability can
be considered as an integral part of the safety discipline, where both
technical and human factors approaches are used to prevent system
failures. The complexity framework for usable security presented
in Section 6 considers usability and security as connected system
properties in a similar manner.
3. HUMAN COGNITIVE CAPACITIES
Psychology and neuroscience researchers have studied human
cognitive capacities extensively, and showed that cognitive strain
may cause people’s committing errors. In security, this can intro-
duce vulnerabilities into the systems and processes people interact
with. In this section we review psychology and neuroscience lit-
erature on human cognitive capacities, and discuss implications of
this research for cyber security.
In the following, we consider the information-processing model
of cognition. Alternative models for cognition also exist, such as
situated cognition [16], activity theory [47], and distributed cog-
nition [12]. These models view human cognition integrated with
the external world. For example, Hollan et al. [12] present the
distributed cognition paradigm where cognitive processes and the
external world interactions are interconnected and considered as a
whole. For the present, we leave these alternative models out of
scope, although in the future they can also be considered within the
framework that we develop in this paper.
3.1 Capacities of Memory
Schacter [75, 76] identified seven memory shortcomings, called
“sins” in his papers: transience, absent-mindness, blocking, misat-
tribution, suggestibility, bias, and persistence.
The first three sins involve various forms of forgetting. Tran-
sience involves the loss of memories with time. Memories that
are not retrieved and rehearsed dissipate over time and the loss
can occur, depending on the level of use, on a scale of seconds,
hours or days. Absent-mindedness entails lack of sufficient atten-
tion at the time a memory is being encoded or retrieved. The clas-
sic example is when people forget where they put their car keys or
glasses. Blocking occurs when some information has been encoded
so deeply that it may sometimes be temporarily inaccessible, even
if people are provided with cues related to the item. Blocking is
especially pronounced in older adults.
The other four sins are “sins of commission”, i.e., some form of
memory is present, but is attributed to an incorrect person, time, or
place. Misattribution involves correctly remembering a fact from
a past experience but misattributing it to an incorrect source. Sug-
gestibility refers to illusory memories occurring in response to sug-
gestions that are made when one is attempting to recall an experi-
ence that may or may not have occurred. In other words, it refers
to the tendency of incorporating information provided by others.
Biases are a person’s pre-existing knowledge and beliefs that influ-
ence memory encoding. Finally, persistence involves remembering
a fact that one would prefer to forget.
The way these memory features interact depends on a variety of
factors, including how much attention the person is giving, how
novel and interesting the experience is, and the kinds of emotions
that are evoked by the information or stimuli. Schacter and many
neuroscientists [77] argue that these features are actually the cost
of an adaptive system that has been hardwired to get the gist of a
situation and not be cluttered with unimportant details.
Omission and commission sins correspond well to the error clas-
sification into “omission errors” and “commission errors” [67] and
have important implications for computer security, for example:
1. Transience: forgetting passwords, steps of authentication rou-
tines, meaning of warnings, key points of awareness training;
2. Absent-mindedness: clicking on a link in an email without pay-
ing attention; forgetting laptops or smartphones in public places;
forgetting an authentication token at home or in some other
place (and not being able to recollect where it is);
3. Blocking: not being able to recollect passwords or PINs that
are usually well remembered, but just slipped the memory in a
concrete situation, for example under stress or observation;
4. Misattribution: falsely recollecting seeing a person on the prem-
ises of the company although actually the person was seen in
some other context (e.g., in a shop or on an exhibition), and thus
letting them to tailgate; email scam that includes the (necessar-
ily incorrect) customer ID of the victim in an attempt to make
the victim “recognise” their ID, believing in the information im-
planted by social engineers in spear phishing e-mails;
5. Suggestibility: agreeing to the course of events as suggested by
a social engineer (“we met last week in this meeting, where X
said this and Y did this, do you remember?”) and thus comply-
ing with his/her request for information or action; email scams
that mention past communication in the email subject, such as
“Re: request No. 23019”;
6. Bias: falsely remembering after an awareness training that a
fraudulent email can only come from an “unknown” person and
thus not being suspicious of an email with a spoofed known
sender;
7. Persistence: remembering an old password or PIN instead of a
new one; remembering that a former colleague is still working
for the company (although the knowledge that it is not so is ac-
tually present) and talking to him/her about confidential things.
3.2 Human Information Processing Capacity
In the classic 1956 psychology paper George Miller [55] dis-
cussed the limits of human capacity to process information, relating
this theory to Shannon’s information theory [78].
Miller compared the human with a communication channel and
stated that when the amount of input information is increased, trans-
mitted information will increase first, and will eventually level off
at some asymptotic value. Miller called this asymptotic value a per-
son’s channel capacity, or the greatest amount of information that
the person can process from a stimulus. It is the upper bound on
the extent to which the person can match their responses to given
stimuli.
In cognitive psychology, cognitive load is the total amount of
mental effort used by the human working memory. Psychology lit-
erature documents classic examples of tasks that were empirically
found to cause cognitive strain in people. In other words, these
tasks cause people to operate at a level that is above their channel
capacity. For example, Pollack [65] conducted an experiment in
which participants were asked to identify tones by assigning num-
bers to them. Participants did not have difficulties in identifying
up to four tones. With five or more tones, mistakes were common.
Pollack also conducted experiments that involved identifying loud-
nesses, saline concentration, and points in a line and in a square.
Miller [55] analyses data from Pollack’s experiments in terms
of the number of bits processed by the participants, considering
that one bit of information provides the possibility to distinguish
between two possible alternatives. On average, the transmitted in-
formation increases linearly to about 2 bits and then reaches the
upper limit of 2.6 bits with standard deviation 0.6, which is about
7 alternatives ±2. Miller hypothesised the existence of a limitation
on our nervous system that keeps our capacities in that range.
The processing capacity varies systematically according to the
individual differences in people. For example, there is broad evi-
dence of age-related decline in a wide spectrum of cognitive abil-
ities [53], which causes the channel capacity of older adults to be
reduced. Also, experts on a task have more channel capacity for
that task compared to novices [89, p. 208ff].
We think that also for every security task there will be an asymp-
tote for human capacity that will put a limit on what can be ex-
pected from people. Well-designed usable security solutions should
allow humans to execute security tasks while minimising the draw
on their capacity.
4. HUMAN CAPACITIES IN SECURITY
In this section we illustrate the role of human capacities in pass-
word authentication [73, 82], USB device decryption [3, 61], and
email encryption [33, 87], based on related literature and accounts
of technology use by employees in organisations.
The security routines described in these examples are arranged
as sequences of tasks, called traces. Users may be impacted during
trace progresses and cognitive or physical load builds up, even if
the single tasks are completed successfully.
If the cumulative demand is perceived to be too high, users may
try to find an alternative to the security task. Critically, if users
perceive a task to be too complex or unworkable, they will try to
modify that complexity themselves, and create workarounds [4].
Individuals may utilise the security knowledge and resources they
have available to them to create what they believe to be a more
usable security control, without intervention from system design-
ers [43]. Where a task is sidestepped or altered, weaknesses in
security may appear.
As a consequence of transience as described in Section 3, a
workaround may be sought if a user forgets how single tasks com-
bine into a sequence (if no care has been taken to provide a se-
quence that is easy for non-experts to remember). If a user decides
that a security task demands the seemingly impossible (e.g., recall
a security question configured years prior – this may be an example
of blocking), this security task will be beyond the user’s personal
capacity. These are arguably tasks which do not consider the reali-
ties of the human mind, and are often attributed to a failing of users
rather than to an oversight by security designers.
4.1 Example 1: Password Authentication
An example of a password authentication routine is shown in
Figure 1. Note that this is only the security routine of entering a
password and being informed of the outcome (successful or unsuc-
cessful authentication). In reference to Figure 1, individual tasks
are identified based on their capacity to impact – and potentially
overload – the user, and for responses to those tasks to modify the
overall trace of security tasks that make up the security routine.
Security Prompt: Task-switching, in itself, may involve persist-
ence (Section 3), where elements of a recent task become confused
with the current task. A user may authenticate in advance so that
they can focus on a primary task unimpeded, or otherwise “batch”
their primary tasks together to reduce task-switching. A choice
may be made to forgot the security task altogether if the (perceived
or actual) effort it demands is regarded as excessive (exceeding the
cognitive load). The individuals may feel embarrassed or become
stressed if they are subject to transience, and cannot recall how
to enact the security routine. This can further impact adjoining
tasks. A user may give up on the task entirely or use a workaround,
where the former results in missed opportunities [4] and the latter
potentially weakens the security qualities.
Recall Password: The number of accounts a user has to manage
can make it difficult to recall which username and password ap-
plies in a given context. Misattribution (Section 3) such as this can
be problematic if the user has employed a coping strategy of us-
ing the similar passwords across multiple accounts to manage what
they perceive as an excessive number of accounts [30]. A password
may be partially remembered, which is still not enough to afford ac-
cess. If the user is working within an organisation, they may have
been forced by policy – or automated security systems – to use a
password that they believe is too complex to remember (especially
amongst a set of passwords of potentially equivalent complexity).
Even where a person is able to recall a string of a given complex-
ity, security system designers/managers may not consider that this
string is one amongst many that they will have to manage [30]. A
person’s ability to create and remember a series of passwords, and
recall the right password for the right system, is in this case their
channel capacity, where that capacity is often assumed by system
designers to be unbounded.
For employees in an organisation, there may be dedicated self-
service or staffed helpdesk support for resetting passwords. If a
password is forgotten, a reset request may be addressed quickly or
may take a long time, losing the engagement of the user and pro-
moting absent-mindedness. An individual may attempt to reduce
their authentication effort by employing a password manager (e.g.,
in browser context) or a password “caching” agent such as ssh-
agent or gpg-agent. A password manager may be sanctioned
by the organisation, or introduced by the user as a personal cop-
ing strategy [43], in either case acting as a potential security weak
point. Alternatively, a user may choose to duplicate a password
across multiple accounts as a means to personally manage their
Figure 1: Password authentication process.
channel capacity. As a workaround a password may already be
stored somewhere local to the machine (e.g., on a sticky note under
the keyboard), or even on the same machine (e.g., in an electronic
file), limiting the need for recall.
Enter Password: People may feel embarrassed if they have to make
multiple entry attempts, especially if their physical dexterity is called
into question – the impact ageing (for instance) has upon the pro-
cess is then both mental and physical. Password entry on a touch-
screen device may take longer than on a keyboard, depending upon
the feedback that the device produces during typing. Password en-
try may potentially happen in parallel with password recall, charac-
ter by character, where longer passwords can demand more of the
user. To aid recall of a single password amongst many, a user may
recall the password creation rules governing accounts for a partic-
ular system amongst many, inviting misattribution and challenging
their channel capacity.
Wait for Outcome: A period of inactivity is an activity in itself,
where the user is expected to hold their attention on the task. There
is potential for absent-mindedness if the user is not actively in-
volved in the progression of the task. There may be an allowed
number of authentication attempts, where reaching that limit forces
a break from the security routine. If difficulties appear – or are ex-
pected – an individual may abandon or circumvent the task, em-
ploying an ad-hoc workaround or repeatable coping strategy.
Release Recall Aids (optional): A recall aid such as a sticky note
or written password may be left near the user’s area of work or kept
within easy reach. The act of creating, updating, or securely storing
a recall aid can further delay completion of the security task.
Return to Primary Task: If periods of inactivity require the users
to re-authenticate, they may be returned to the task “Recall Pass-
word” at any time before or after returning to the primary task,
confusing the persistence of different tasks in memory. Once au-
thenticated, an individual may struggle to recall what they wanted
to do. Moving between a primary task and a security task may not
simply be a case of switching between the two, but of completing
a blocking security task and then recalling where they were in the
previous task, which can demand effort and leave the individual
disorientated for a time. Any stress felt during the security routine
may linger as frustration, carried into any tasks that follow.
Abandon / Circumvent Task: A habit may be reinforced where
the individual refuses to engage with the task again or decides to
engage in a workaround behaviour or coping strategy as a prefer-
ence, instead of the advocated behaviour.
4.2 Example 2: USB Device Decryption
The usage of an encrypted USB storage device, where the data
on the device have to be accessed on various computers across a
range of locations [3], may also challenge users’ capacities.
We assume that encryption software must run on a computer
when an encrypted USB storage device is connected, requiring a
password. As in the authentication example, there will be a Secu-
rity Prompt for entering a password, here to activate the decryp-
tion process. The user will need to Recall Password and Enter
Password (and subsequently Release Recall Aids before a Return
to Primary Task). However, given the mobile nature of USB stor-
age devices, the location in which these tasks occur may be poten-
tially insecure (e.g., in transit or at a business event where shoulder
surfing for the decryption password may be feasible). Channel ca-
pacity of the users is especially critical here, as they would have to
remain mindful of their immediate surroundings while also work-
ing with the device, constantly evaluating changes in their envi-
ronment in order to avoid shoulder-surfing or tampering with the
device. The time cost of decrypting the device can promote absent-
mindedness.
In order to prevent damage if the USB stick were to be lost
or stolen (absent-mindedness), users would be strongly encour-
aged to enforce encryption of stored data when outside of company
premises, challenging their cognitive capacity to understand if the
device is genuinely encrypted, especially if the organisation is not
clear about what constitutes appropriate encryption.
The device and decryption software may not work correctly with
the computer it is connected to: the computer may be unsupported
by the employer organisation, or the employee may recall the de-
cryption procedure incorrectly (transience or bias). The user may
then find some ad-hoc means to access the device, requiring secu-
rity and technology expertise alongside their limited security train-
ing, while the machine itself may in fact not allow them to access
the device in any other way, promoting frustration.
Equally, if the individual has been instructed to contact a support
team in such instances, they would have to recall the exact process
for reaching the support team (with potential misattribution) – this
may all occur while under time pressure to access the device. Prior
negative or stressful experiences of interacting with IT support may
influence the user to Abandon / Circumvent Task.
Friendly individuals who have malicious intentions – or lack of
awareness of security implications – may offer seemingly easier
means to access content (e.g., encouraging the user to access cor-
porate systems through their own computer, an example of sug-
gestibility). Former colleagues may offer to help in the same way,
as if they are still co-workers (persistence).
Employees may balance the availability of data against the con-
fidentiality risk to their organisation if they are especially fearful –
and distressed – by the possibility of not having guaranteed access
to content [4]. Thus, a user may Abandon / Circumvent Task
by choosing not to encrypt the device at all (if encryption is not
enforced), or send the files to themselves via unencrypted email.
4.3 Example 3: Email Encryption
We hypothesize that any email encryption system that requires
understanding of the public key infrastructure (PKI) will be be-
yond capacity for a critical mass of non-expert Internet users, as
suggested by the analysis presented below.
End-to-end email encryption has been considered the holy grail
of usable security since the seminal investigation of PGP usability
by Whitten and Tygar [87]. This first study uncovered the inabil-
ity of untrained users to execute the typical tasks required to set up
and use PGP. Whereas the study’s authors attribute this failure to
the unusable user interface of the PGP email client, Garfinkel and
Miller [33] suggest that the users were unable to grasp the key cer-
tification model of PGP. Moreover, they also criticise the need for
third party certificates for the usage of S/MIME, as it leads to us-
ability and understanding problems, including the necessity to react
to certificate warnings for unknown certification authorities.
The “Johnny 2” study [33] uncovered yet another PKI-related
problem: in a system that relies on self-signed certificates, an ac-
tive attacker can easily convince the users to trust the attacker’s key
(suggestibility), which can also be attributed to a fundamental mis-
understanding of security guarantees the PKI provides in this case.
Not surprisingly, one of the most recent email encryption sys-
tems specifically designed with usability in mind [71] does not use
PKI at all and relies on key escrow in order to hide security details
from the users.
A qualitative study of attitudes to and understanding of email
encryption by Renaud et al. [69] also confirms that the non-usage
of encrypted email is not entirely due to the usability issues, but
also results from misconceptions and incomplete understanding of
email architecture and email security.
5. MEASURING HUMAN CAPACITY FOR
SECURITY TASKS
Is the cognitive effort for security tasks measurable? We hypoth-
esise that the answer is ‘yes’. Here we propose a proof-of-concept
methodology for the corresponding experimental design [49].
This methodology has two goals. The first is to allow security
researchers and practitioners to discover the level of cognitive ef-
fort required by a security task, especially whether this effort is
within human capacity. The second goal is to design a catalogue
of capacities for common security tasks that can be consulted by
the security community when designing security mechanisms and
policies. In the following, we first discuss the measurement of sin-
gle security tasks (Section 5.1), then generalise to the measurement
of sequences of security tasks, or traces (Section 5.2), and then dis-
cuss incorporating primary task, users’ context and attacks into the
measurements (Section 5.3).
5.1 Measuring Single Security Tasks
We consider a set T of common security tasks or expected be-
haviours, such as authenticating using a password or looking out for
suspicious emails and websites. The tasks in T may have different
levels of detail, depending on the measurement goal and the mea-
surement method. For example, password authentication or USB
device decryption can be broken into tasks as described in Sec-
tion 4. Additional examples of tasks may include checking whether
the email address of the sender and the name of the sender match
in an email, or looking for the lock icon or “https” when providing
sensitive information online.
The cognitive load for tasks that involve user interaction with
some interface elements will also depend on the implementation
of these elements (e.g., noticing and understanding the lock icon),
such that the description of the user interface should be included in
the task description. For some other tasks, such as recalling a pass-
word, the user interface may or may not not play an important role.
The goal is to measure the cognitive strain caused by these tasks.
One of the challenges is designing an experiment that isolates the
targeted task or behaviour in a meaningful way.
We also consider the intended users U for the tasks in T . The
users may differ in their capacities, for example according to their
age, gender, education, work experience or other demographic char-
acteristics, therefore the specification of the intended users is im-
portant. For security tasks that should be executed by any Inter-
net user, e.g., email encryption, the specification U would include
age, gender and education distribution of the Internet population
by country of residence, and the measurement results might differ
accordingly. For more specific security tasks, such as, e.g., find-
ing buffer overflows in pieces of code, U might specify level of
programming experience in years or lines of code.
Consider a set Ai of possible inputs that must be processed by
U for each task Ti ∈ T and for each input aj ∈ Ai. For example,
suppose Ti is the task of recalling a password. Depending on the
requirement of the authentication system, people might be asked
to recall a password of just four digits, or at least eight charac-
ters, or at least eight characters from three of four character classes
(while requiring that the password not match any words in a crack-
ing dictionary) [44]. We state the following null and alternative
hypothesis for a task Ti ∈ T and an input aj ∈ Ai:
• H0i: the execution of Ti does not cause cognitive strain in
U for the input aj .
• H1i: the execution of Ti causes cognitive strain in U for the
input aj .
The process of formulating and testing the hypotheses requires
an understanding of what cognitive strain is and how to measure it.
In the psychology and neuroscience literature, there are several
works addressing how to measure mental effort and cognitive strain.
For example, Paas and Van Merienboer [58] developed a relative
condition efficiency to measure perceived mental effort. Granholm
et al. [34] propose the use of pupillary responses to measure cog-
nitive strain. Pupillary responses increase with the cognitive load,
reach an asymptote at the limit of human capacity and then de-
crease at cognitive strain. Cooper-Martin [20] used self-reports on
time and cognitive strain.
Measurement of cognitive strain is also widely used in cognitive
engineering for all stages of human information processing (atten-
tion, memory workload, cognition) and applied to such complex
tasks as distracted driving (i.e., driving while eating, conversing
with the passengers or making a phone call) [89].
We leave an in-depth investigation of different measurement meth-
ods out of scope of the present paper. Our goal is to present one
possible measurement framework, whereby we do not claim to pres-
ent the most convenient or the most up-to-date one.
A relatively convenient and affordable example of a measure-
ment method for cognitive strain is ECG (electrocardiogram), which
is a test that records the electrical activity in the heart. An ECG de-
vice records signals across multiple heart beats and produces a strip
that can be interpreted by a healthcare professional or specialised
software. There are several types of devices for measuring ECG
via wrist or waist band in the market [64], and there are MATLAB-
based open source software to interpret the various ECG compo-
nents [9, 84].
Several studies [37,60] identify a relationship between heart rate
variability (HRV) in ECG recordings and stress caused by strain
(cognitive or physical). By using a baseline of HRV measurements
corresponding to cognitive strain conditions, one can then discover
whether any Ti(aj) is beyond human capacity.
Stress is a feeling of strain and pressure and occurs when people
feel they are unable to manage the demands placed on them, which
can be cognitive or physical tasks, deadlines, major life events
etc. [11]. In these cases the demands of the situation outweigh
the body’s ability to cope. Regardless of the type of straining task
or situation, the psychological feelings or “flight or fight” induced
by stress causes the same adverse conditions in the body, be it a
physical threat or impossible deadlines [1].
Measurements of security-related tasks must then be calibrated
against a baseline of cognitive strain. We propose to select a task
(not necessarily security-related) on an input known to cause cog-
nitive strain in people and measure people’s ECG in such condi-
tions. One candidate baseline task is Pollack’s test of recogni-
tion of different pitches [65] described in Section 3, where HRV
measurements can be introduced. Baseline measurements may be
amassed gradually, dictated by research goals. Collection may fo-
cus on specific demographic characteristics, such as age groups for
instance, as literature shows that people’s cognitive skills decline
with age [53].
With the baseline for ECG measurements for cognitive strain,
one can design experiments to discover whether someone perform-
ing a security task Ti for input aj experiences cognitive strain. If
the HRV recordings for Ti(aj) indicate cognitive strain, this means
that performing Ti(aj) is beyond this person’s capacity.
5.2 Measuring Traces
We now discuss how to measure sequences of tasks, or traces,
for the common security mechanisms as described in Section 4.
That is, we would like to know how the combination of tasks with
known upper bounds on capacities combine into a security mecha-
nism. Is the cognitive strain adding up when the sequence of tasks
is executed? Does a specific task in a trace cause cognitive strain?
Is it possible to predict upper bound on capacity for a trace if we
know upper bounds for each of its tasks?
The measurement procedure of a trace is similar to the measure-
ment of individual tasks. However, careful experimental design is
needed to determine the boundary between tasks. For example,
how can one determine the time interval in which the user recalls a
password? Should the beginning of this time interval be fixed at the
point in time when the password prompt appears? There is no guar-
antee, however, that the user notices the prompt at the exact point
in time of its appearance. One can use an eye tracking device to
measure this, or one can try to approximate from when the prompt
appears (perhaps based on data from previous experiments). In this
way, measurement of a trace may incorporate a number of mea-
surement devices.
Password recollection may begin when a person starts typing in
a password, but at that moment recollection may not be complete.
Recollection and entry are not then a sequence, but a parallel ex-
ecution of tasks. Moreover, if a person under observation types a
letter and then corrects it, the cause may be an accidental slip on the
wrong key, or a wrongly remembered character that was corrected
“on the fly”.
This example shows that the desired goal of measuring the com-
bination of tasks may not always be achievable, or demand sub-
stantial resources. The considerations of what can and what should
be measured are highly dependent on the measurement goals and
of the security mechanism in question.
5.3 Context, Primary Task, and Attacks
As discussed in Section 2.1, usability tests of security mecha-
nisms should include the specification of the primary task and of the
adversary, when appropriate. Also the context of use (Is the work-
ing environment noisy? Are there many interruptions?) is tradi-
tionally considered in usability testing, and especially with safety-
critical tasks such as driving, aircraft control, medical equipment
operation or nuclear plant operation [67].
Ideally, we would like to know how the human capacities in se-
curity tasks change when a person is focused on their primary task,
or interrupted, or when the system is under a technical or non-
technical attack. Examples of studies in usable security (that did
not measure capacities, however) are the study of S/MIME usabil-
ity by Garfinkel and Miller [33] and various studies on suscepti-
bility to phishing [17, 39, 45], reactions to active security warn-
ings [26, 28, 83] and to passive security indicators [26, 51, 90].
Especially interesting is the recent study of Bluetooth pairing in
presence of noise by Kaczmarek et al. [40].
Although common sense might suggest that interruptions nega-
tively impact capacity, in the above study the likelihood of a suc-
cessful task outcome increased in the presence of noise. The au-
thors provide possible explanations for this fact based on the psy-
chology literature. One of the explanations is that for tasks that
are executed at the level much lower than the actual capacity, addi-
tional noise sharpens the attention, whereas for tasks that are exe-
cuted closely to the upper bound on capacity, additional noise leads
to overload and thus to lower task performance. However, as the
capacity was not measured in this experiment, this assumption can-
not be verified. As future work we plan to conduct realistic experi-
ments to evaluate the proposed methodology, and to collect metrics
for common security tasks.
6. A COMPLEXITY FRAMEWORK FOR
USABLE SECURITY
We have seen that it is possible to measure cognitive effort and
that there is scientific evidence for the existence of tasks that are
beyond people’s cognitive capacity. In the light of these facts, we
propose a conceptual framework that attempts to clarify the defini-
tion of the term usable security in relation to its two dimensions,
usability and security, and define several complexity categories for
systems within this framework. This framework acts as a prototype
structure for comparing tasks and experimental measures. It is also
something of a “blunt tool” for eliminating obviously impossible
tasks, where up to now the need to make such a judgement has
arguably been overlooked.
Informally, a system is secure and usable if all tasks that the
users have to execute to achieve their primary goal are within their
capacity. However, this informal definition hides a lot of important
details that we are able to pinpoint only in the process of rigorous
reasoning about the formalisation of this concept.
6.1 Definition of the Complexity Framework
A complexity framework for usable security is a tuple
〈S ,U ,T ,SET ,UET 〉 where:
• S is a socio-technical system;
• U is the specification of intended users of S ;
• T is the set of user tasks that a user may be asked to execute;
• SET is the security evaluation toolkit, i.e., the set of methods
and tools used to establish S ’s security;
• UET is the usability evaluation toolkit, i.e., the set of methods
and processes used to establish S ’s usability.
In the following we describe the framework’s elements in detail.
S is the specification of the socio-technical system in its operat-
ing environment. The specification includes all the system’s com-
ponents, their actions and interactions with the environment and
with the user, including users’ actions (e.g., see [29]). The speci-
fication also makes assumptions about S analysis. These assump-
tions may also consider the users, such as their honesty or compli-
ance with policies.
U is the specification of the intended users. It may include char-
acteristics (e.g., age, gender, education, or experience) that deter-
mine the users’ capacities in reference to the environment where S
and U operate. As discussed in Section 1, U does not necessarily
model a person, but can equally represent a group of people or a
person using devices that increase the ability to perform tasks.
T is the set of user tasks, such as recalling a password, deciding
whether a self-signed certificate is trustworthy or understanding a
policy. assessing a risk. the tasks depends on the level at which
the usability should be assessed and on the available measurement
methods. Thus, we may decide not to consider the task “recall a
single character of a password”, either because we cannot measure
it, or because we are interested only in the task of recalling the
whole password.
T ∗ denotes the set of user traces consisting of T and of all se-
quences of tasks, including the empty sequence.
SET is a tuple 〈A,R, AttackTraces(S ,A,R)〉 where:
• A,R are the elements necessary to establish S ’s security. A is
the model of the adversary, andR are the security requirements,
i.e., the desired security properties of the system.
R can include, for instance, classical properties such as data
integrity and user authentication, but also others such as veri-
fiability [24]. A can have socio-technical capabilities (such as
social engineering) and therefore exploit vulnerabilities in any
component of S , including the human interfaces and human in-
teractions.
• AttackTraces(S ,A,R) ⊆ T ∗ is a predicate that decides wheth-
er S , under the assumptions stated, satisfies the security re-
quirements R in the presence of the adversary A. If S is in-
secure, AttackTraces(S ,A,R) returns the set of user traces
with possible attacks. (i.e., the attack user traces). If S is se-
cure, AttackTraces(S ,A,R) returns the empty set.
We do not specify how to evaluate AttackTraces(S ,A,R),
i.e., how to establish the security properties of S , as this goes be-
yond the level of abstraction of this framework. This predicate rep-
resents the ability to say: “there is evidence that S satisfies the
requirements R in the presence of the adversary A” or “there is ev-
idence that S does not satisfyR”. The evidence may be justified by
applying a formal analysis method such as model checking [7, 18],
or be grounded in security assessment strategies and compliance to
standards, or rely on the practically established resilience to attacks
(“this system is considered secure because up to now nobody has
been able to break it”).
UET is a tuple
〈Traces(S ,A), InCapacity(U ), OutCapacity(U )〉 where:
• Traces(S ,A) ⊆ T ∗ are sequences of user traces that S may
ask the user to execute, including those caused by the adversary
A. That is, AttackTraces(S ,A,R) ⊆ Traces(S ,A).
Within Traces(S ,A) we identify GoalTraces(S ,A), the set
of traces that contain at least one user’s goal-reaching task. The
system’s goal can be different from the user’s goal. A user may
aim at sending an email, the system to ensure that the e-mail is
encrypted.
• InCapacity(U ) ⊆ T ∗ are sequences of tasks within U ’s ca-
pacity;
• OutCapacity(U ) ⊆ T ∗ are sequences of tasks beyond U ’s
capacity.
• InCapacity(U ) and OutCapacity(U ) must satisfy the fol-
lowing conditions:
(a) InCapacity(U ) ∩ OutCapacity(U ) = ∅ i.e., there is
no ambiguity about which traces are within U ’s capacity, and
which traces are beyond U ’s capacity;
(b) if t ∈ OutCapacity(U ) then tt′ ∈ OutCapacity(U ) ∀
t′ ∈ T ∗ i.e., if t is beyond the user’s capacity, so it must be any
extension of t.
The two above sets define U ’s capabilities. The framework as-
sumes that such capabilities can be measured, but it abstracts from
any specific measurement method. In Section 5 we presented one
possible measurement method and discussed others.
Traces(S ,A)\(InCapacity(U )∪ OutCapacity(U )) are the
user traces about which it is unknown whether they are within or
beyond U ’s capacity.
6.2 Complexity Categories for Usable Security
In the following we propose a preliminary classification for sys-
tems depending on their usability and security properties.
6.2.1 Usable and Unusable Security
The role of usability for secure systems is to provide evidence
that the user traces of the system are within users’ capacity. Oth-
erwise, the system cannot be claimed to be secure and usable.
The first complexity category defines secure systems where all user
traces are within users’ capacity.
Definition 1 (Secure & Usable (SU )).
S is secure and usable if AttackTraces(S ,A,R) = ∅ and
Traces(S ,A) ⊆ InCapacity(U ).
We can also consider systems where not all, but only some traces
are within U ’s capacity. Other traces can be beyond capacity or
of unknown capacity. For this class of systems, one would either
gather more evidence to prove that all their traces are within capac-
ity or attempt to convert the system into the system S ′ that, with
the same security guarantees, offers only traces that are known to
be within the users’ capacity. This is the category of systems that
are partially usable.
Definition 2 (Secure & Partially Usable (SpU )).
S is secure and partially usable if AttackTraces(S ,A,R) = ∅
and GoalTraces(S ,A) ∩ InCapacity(U ) 6= ∅.
The definition above demands that there is at least one usable
user’s goal-reaching trace in the system. This restriction excludes
from the definition systems whose users stop before reaching their
gaols because of some task beyond capacity on the way.
The next complexity category defines systems that have no traces
that are known to be beyond U ’s capacity. However, it may be
unknown whether any traces within capacity exist in the system.
Definition 3 (Secure & Maybe Usable (SmU )).
S secure and maybe usable if AttackTraces(S ,A,R) = ∅ and
Traces(S ,A) ∩ OutCapacity(U ) = ∅.
The complexity categories SmU and SpU both include SU .
Systems in SmU but not in SpU are systems for which one would
have to gather more evidence in order to understand their usability.
For the next class of systems, we do not know whether they have
traces that are known to be within or beyond capacity.
Definition 4 (Secure & Unknown Usable (SuU )).
S is secure and unknown usable if AttackTraces(S ,A,R) = ∅
and Traces(S ,A)∩(InCapacity(U )∪OutCapacity(U )) = ∅.
The next two complexity categories include systems that are se-
cure, but not usable.
Definition 5 (Secure & Unusable (S¬U )).
S is secure unusable if AttackTraces(S ,A,R) = ∅ and
GoalTraces(S ,A) ⊆ OutCapacity.
Definition 5 identifies the complexity class of systems whose
goal-reaching user traces are all beyondU ’s capacity. With respect
to usability these are inappropriately designed systems.
We next define systems where only some goal-reaching traces
are beyond capacity. These systems can be made usable if the un-
usable traces could be excluded from them through re-design, but
it is not known whether the possibility for an alternative, usable
design exists.
Definition 6 (Secure & Partially Unusable (Sp¬U )).
S is secure and partially unusable if AttackTraces(S ,A,R) = ∅
and GoalTraces(S ,A) ∩ OutCapacity 6= ∅.
6.2.2 Usable and Unusable Insecurity
We now define complexity categories for systems which are in-
secure. Here, if the usability assessment provides evidence that
some attack traces are within users’ capacity, the system should be
considered insecure. On the contrary, if all attack traces prove to
be beyond users’ capacity, the system may become secure after a
reassessment of its assumptions on U .
The first complexity category comprises the systems that are in-
secure and whose traces are all within capacity; in particular, the
attack traces are also within the capacity of U . Such systems may
have potentially serious security implications, since the users are
able to execute all traces, including the traces that lead to an attack.
Definition 7 (Insecure & Usable ((¬S)U )).
S is insecure and usable if AttackTraces(S ,A,R) 6= ∅
and Traces(S ,A) ⊆ InCapacity(U ).
The second category identifies systems that are insecure and for
which there is evidence that some attack traces are usable. There-
fore, the avenues for usability within the system can potentially be
a catalyst (albeit indirectly) for an attack.
Definition 8 (Insecure & Partially Usable ((¬S)pU )).
S is insecure and partially usable if AttackTraces(S ,A,R) 6= ∅
and AttackTraces(S ,A,R) ∩ InCapacity(U ) 6= ∅.
The next two categories define insecure systems that do not have
usable attack traces, but it is also not known whether all attack
traces are unusable.
Definition 9 (Insecure & Maybe Usable ((¬S)mU )).
S is insecure and maybe usable if AttackTraces(S ,A,R) 6= ∅
and AttackTraces(S ,A,R) ∩ OutCapacity(U ) = ∅.
Definition 10 (Insecure & Unknown Usable ((¬S)uU )).
S is insecure and unknown usable if AttackTraces(S ,A,R) 6= ∅
and AttackTraces(S ,A,R) ∩(
OutCapacity(U ) ∪ InCapacity(U )) = ∅.
The last category represents systems that are insecure and unus-
able. All attack traces are beyond U ’s capacity, which means that
this system could potentially be made secure through re-design.
This can happen if the redesigned system incorporates more realis-
tic assumptions about its users, thus eliminating attack traces that
are beyond capacity. Of course, this measure alone would not guar-
antee that the system is secure and usable, as the usability and the
security of the remaining traces will have to be assessed.
Definition 11 (Insecure Unusable (¬S¬U )).
S is insecure unusable if AttackTraces(S ,A,R) 6= ∅
and AttackTraces(S ,A,R) ⊆ OutCapacity(U ).
More complexity categories can be defined as needed. In the
next section, we give an example on the framework usage.
6.3 Using the Framework: An Example
Let us consider a user who logs into his email account (e.g.,
Gmail) and two procedures of authentication: the first requires the
user to type an alphanumeric user-name and password; the other ex-
pects a two-step verification where the username and password are
followed by a further factor stored in a USB security-key device,
like the YubiKey (see www.yubico.com), activated by pressing a
button on the device. The framework will help us categorise the
usable security of the two procedures. We need to specify S, U ,
and T , and the toolkits SET and UET and so the threat model,
the security requirements, and the tasks within/beyond capacity.
S includes the protocols of both the browser and Google, that is,
the single and the two-step authentication procedures including the
interactions with the user. The first procedure’s protocol is there-
fore made of actions/tasks such as, for instance, “wait for the user
to type the credentials”, and “check the credential”. The protocol
either grants access or shows a warning and starts over again. in-
sert the USB token” and “wait for the user to press the button on
it”. This triggers the execution of another protocol that grants ac-
cess only if the security-key comes from a YubiKey previously reg-
istered to the account. S’s context is limited to one mail account
and one USB stick: we do not consider multiple accounts, several
usernames and passwords, and plentiful USB devices.
U is a user who wants to access the mail account. We assume
he can use a written paper note of the password in case he needs to
recall it. In the second procedure, U includes also the YubiKey. U
defines the capacities we are going to consider in the analysis.
T are the user tasks. For instance: “recalling the password”, or
alternatively, “retrieve the password” (i.e., “read it from the paper
note), “type the username and the password”, “insert the USB to-
ken”, and so on. The choice of the tasks determines the level of
abstraction considered in the framework.
Then the framework assumes two toolkits, one for the security
analysis (SET ), the other for the usability analysis (UET ).
SET defines the adversary (A) and the security requirements (R).
We assume A to be a person who can read by shoulder surfing and
memorise a password if this is written on paper and shown openly.
A can also spy what is typed on a keyboard, but he is able to mem-
orise only easy-to-recall sequences (e.g., a weak password). As a
security requirement we have: “the adversary should be able to im-
personate the user and get access to his account”. The choice of A
and R defines the boundaries of our security analysis.
We have not conducted the analysis in reality but, it seems sound
to imagine an attack in the first procedure, where A shoulder surfs
the username and password and reuses it. This happens when the
user is either retrieving a long hard-to-recall password from the
paper note or entering an easy-to-recall password. In both cases,
R is violated. The second scenario is more secure, at least with
respect to this A. Even if A can learn the username and password
pair, he cannot see the password stored in the USB device. An
A with different abilities (e.g., stealing objects) could still violate
R, but this means changing the instantiation of the framework and
performing another analysis.
UET defines the sequences of user tasks compatible with the
execution of the two procedures. It also defines the goal traces,
those ending with the user accessing the account, and specifies the
tasks or sequences of tasks which are within/beyond U ’s capacity.
For sake of example, we suppose to have such knowledge and we
assume that “recalling the password” is the only task beyond human
capacity if the password is long and random.
In the first procedure the goal can be reached only either when
the user either retrieves a hard-to-recall password from the paper
note and types it in, or when he recalls and types an easy-to-recall
password. Such actions are within U ’s capacity and appear in an
attack trace. Other traces, like those that include recalling a hard-
to-recall password and typing it in, are possible but not within ca-
pacity. The first procedure is therefore insecure and partially usable
(i.e., (¬S)pU ). Note that if we had assumed only hard-to-recall
passwords and forced U to rely on his memory to retrieve the pass-
word, all goal traces would have been beyond capacity and the ad-
versary would have had nothing to spy upon. The procedure would
have been secure and unusable (i.e., S¬U ). In the second proce-
dure all traces that reach the user goal are made of tasks within
capacity. This time they include actions like “insert USB device”
and “press button on the USB”. The adversary can learn username
and password, but he cannot see the second factor of authentication.
Under the specific assumptions of this instance of the framework,
the second procedure is secure and usable (i.e., SU ).
Note that we are not allowed to extend our conclusions to other
procedures. In principle, we cannot conclude anything if we change
the context (e.g., the user has to handle multiple accounts), or our
assumptions (e.g., the adversary can steal objects). However, this
approach be used to explore options to be both secure and produc-
tive (i.e., through choice of a particular security control, or some
other support mechanism).
6.4 Improving Usable Security
Our framework suggests a partial order >s on systems accord-
ing to their security. Informally speaking, S >s S ′ if the maximal
set of security requirements that S satisfies contains the maximal
set of security requirements that S ′ satisfies, assuming the analysis
is done under the same assumptions and threat model. Two sys-
tems are equivalent in terms of security when they satisfy the same
maximal set of security requirements.
Figure 2: A representation of a situation where our framework
can help. S is an actual system. S′ a version of it more secure
but less usable (top left), or more usable but less secure (bottom
right). The ideal version (top right) improves both.
Similarly, our framework defines a partial order >u on systems
according to their usability. This is defined by partitioning the
space of all systems by using our complexity categories and the
inclusiveness relations between them. For example, SU >u SpU ,
because all systems in SU are at least as usable as any system in
SpU , and systems in SU should be considered to be more strongly
usable than those in SpU \ SU . The framework also gives rise to
a usability equivalence relation.
To summarise, our framework can be used to reason about the
improvement of usable security for a given system S . We may
want to find a security-equivalent system specification S ′ that has
a higher degree of usability according to the partial order among
complexity categories. Otherwise we may aim to find a usability-
equivalent specification with a higher degree of security. In this
case we cannot identify such systems, we may ask whether one of
the system’s properties, security or usability, should be degraded if
it is found to be hampering the quality of the other property. The
best solution would be, however, to simultaneously improve both,
security and usability, by redesigning the system. These possibili-
ties are illustrated in Figure 2.
7. RELATED WORK
This interdisciplinary position paper intersects the areas of mem-
ory science and cognitive psychology (Section 3), ECG processing
and relationship with cognitive strain (Section 5), usability (Sec-
tion 2) and human-centred security. In this section we focus on
discussion of related work from the latter area.
Edwards et al. [25] discuss the limitations of automating secu-
rity for end-users and propose to study the limits of automation.
Our work complements this idea, as we consider capacities and
limits of the users for non-automated security mechanisms.
Cranor [22] proposes a framework for reasoning about the hu-
man in the loop when designing secure systems. The main idea is
that whenever it is not possible to get humans out of the decision
making process for the security mechanisms, their roles should be
considered during the system design to avoid security breaches and
to provide fail-safe alternatives. Our work complements this idea
by providing a clear picture of what people can or cannot do.
Security ceremonies [27] model human behaviour as an integral
part of security routines. As discussed in various extensions to the
security ceremony analysis [6, 41, 66], security ceremonies should
be expanded beyond considering humans as state machines. In our
framework, we present a methodology for considering a more re-
alistic model of human behaviour in security ceremonies by taking
into account and measuring users’ capacities.
Pfleeger and Caputo [62] discuss areas of behavioural science
with relevance to cyber security, such as cognitive dissonance, heu-
ristics and biases, and health behavioural models. They also ex-
amine memory limitations and where these are relevant to people’s
ability to perform security tasks. The authors argue that findings
from behavioural sciences can be used to guide good security be-
haviour and reduce the perceived effort of security by providing
users with appropriate tools and information. The authors propose
to create a repository of such findings. We develop this idea fur-
ther, proposing capture of data on the feasibility of tasks for hu-
mans, where our framework would enable objective comparison of
different options in such a repository.
Work by Pfleeger et al. [63] explores other areas of behavioural
sciences, such as moral values and habit formation, and how they
may be leveraged to craft targeted awareness programs that can
transform security behaviours. One area of focus is how to encour-
age better security habits, with security routines that are properly
designed to support those habits. The work also refers to “user’s
energy”, and how best to arrange tasks for the user’s benefit. Our
framework affords identification of security routines and mecha-
nisms that are beneficial for the users (within capacity), avoiding
those that are beyond capacity.
Becker and Beuster [5] present a methodology for formally spec-
ifying security properties of user interfaces. They augment the
GOMS models with formalisms to represent an application and the
assumptions that a user makes about the application, adapting con-
cepts from human-computer interaction (HCI) to allow reasoning
about the security of user interfaces, such as in e-voting systems.
The work acknowledges the criticality of the user interface from
a security perspective, including the impact that variations in the
user interface design can have upon the capacity to reach a success-
ful and secure outcome. We similarly provide a formal structure
for reasoning about the security and usability of systems, adapting
lessons from the study of cognition to understand where errors can
occur. The authors posit that their framework can support auto-
mated reasoning about the potential for errors in a system. Task
traces analysed under our framework may warrant development of
similar capabilities.
Bonneau et al. [13] evaluate a range of technologies, such as
password manager applications, one-time passwords, and hardware
tokens, as alternatives to the use of text passwords. Criteria for
comparison cover usability, deployability and security benefits. In
this sense, the suitability of individual mechanisms is considered
in terms of how they fit with the system, and the demands made
upon components of a system. This includes humans, for instance
whether they would have to carry anything with them or if proper
use of the technology is easy to learn. In this way the work does
not directly consider the capacities of the individual to complete
a task, but does consider how a security mechanism may impact
a user. We look at security from the perspective of the user and
consider the demands that a range of tasks places upon them (where
an individual may have to manage many security mechanisms).
Herley [35] uses a traditional economic approach to consider the
users as exercising a rational choice over their security decisions. If
a security risk is perceived as high, a user may accept a higher cost
and complete the security task. Conversely, the cost of compliance
may be perceived as requiring too much effort, and so a person
may choose to ignore security. We consider situations where the
users are not able to complete security tasks, even if they wanted
to do so. In this case, one could model “beyond capacity” tasks as
having infinite costs. Our framework complements this approach
by providing a complexity framework for holistic evaluation of the
system’s security and its costs for the user.
Böhme and Grossklags consider user attention for security tasks
as a public good and develop the “lump of attention” model where
the consumption of user resources can be optimized from the game-
theoretical perspective. In this model, if users are interrupted by
security interactions, they react in an appropriate way if and only
if their “attention budget” is not exhausted. This idea is close to
our concept, as we propose to investigate the tasks that systemati-
cally exhaust human internal resources and therefore should not be
imposed on the users at all.
Bonneau and Schechter [14] consider the capacity of human mem-
ory to remember secrets, showing that by using a mnemonic tech-
nique called “spaced repetition” people can remember 56-bit se-
crets with seemingly reasonable effort. Within our framework, we
could consider spaced repetition as a task integrated into the au-
thentication process and assess the security and usability of the
corresponding system. Similarly, the overall suitability of other
“enhancing” techniques for security tasks could be assessed using
our framework.
Mannan and van Oorschot [52] show that expectations of banks
on security behaviour of their online banking customers seem to be
unreasonably high, as even technically savvy users do not follow
them. The authors wonder whether users cannot or do not want to
exhibit the required security behaviours. Our framework allows the
distinction of the case where the user does not want to do a security
task (then the user may be held responsible for non-compliance
under some circumstances) from the cases where the user is not
able to do a security task (then the user definitely should not be
blamed for non-compliance).
The Compliance Budget [4] considers how the actual and per-
ceived costs of enacting security impact upon the security behaviours
of employees within organisations. Factors such as cognitive and
physical load, and the individual rationalisation of both sanctions
(for sidestepping security) and missed opportunities (due to abid-
ing by security demands) are considered. These factors are framed
in terms of a cost/benefit analysis, but one where an individual may
have good will towards security and a willingness to behave se-
curely for the good of the organisation, even at personal cost and
lack of perceived personal benefit. The work provides heuristics for
considering how security responsibilities affect the user depending
upon the associated burden and disruption to primary tasks. Our
work investigates how the impact of individual security mecha-
nisms can be measured objectively.
8. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper we advocate the case for complexity analysis in us-
able security. Our claim is that usable security might not be achiev-
able for certain tasks on account of the intrinsic characteristics of
human cognitive capacities, that is, some tasks (including some ad-
vocated today) may be simply impossible for the users. We pro-
pose to systematically investigate which security tasks are beyond
capacity for their intended users.
Understanding usable security from a complexity point of view
and measuring human capacity for security tasks is invaluable for
researchers and practitioners while designing security mechanisms
and policies. If human capacity for a task is lower than the (over-
stated) security requirements, complementary security mechanisms
should be designed and employed.
We develop an initial formalisation framework for complexity
categories for usable security. Our taxonomy distinguishes be-
tween systems that are secure and usable (i.e., within human ca-
pacity), and unusable secure systems, as well as secure systems of
unknown usability. We also consider insecure systems and their re-
lationship with usability. We identify as future work the derivation
of a more comprehensive taxonomy (including principles from the
behavioural sciences [62]), and investigation of relationships be-
tween systems belonging to different complexity categories. This
is particularly useful for comparing the usable security of different
candidate implementations of a specific system.
The implementation of a complexity framework, a future step for
the authors, will generate a catalogue of average upper bounds for
different implementations of common tasks and also how they vary
across the different characteristics of the intended users, such as age
group or expertise. This catalogue would provide rich information
for the design of security mechanisms and for development and
implementation of realistic security policies.
To understand the role of expertise and motivation, we will con-
sider the influence of training and learning upon human capacities
for security tasks. Work by Reason [68] has for instance examined
human behaviour in the realm of safety, including different kinds
of mistakes (rule-based and knowledge-based), and applications of
cognitive ability to the completion of tasks (conscious, mixed, and
automatic). Within our framework these findings may be useful
to determine where training can be targeted to specifically support
tasks, where it appears too burdensome, or where learning specific
techniques itself may be beyond the capacity of intended users. In
the latter cases, support mechanisms may be necessary – instead of
training – to help users to complete a task.
Some tasks may strain users to their upper bound of capacity
only when tasks are combined. To combine the costs of individ-
ual tasks, a unit of measurement is necessary. Future work will
consider how to compose the security and usability measures of
disparate tasks together, and how to objectively compare one de-
mand with another. We hope that research methods and results
from the discipline of cognitive engineering will be helpful. It con-
siders methods for cognitive task analysis, including task switch-
ing and multitasking, which is highly relevant for the security do-
main [50, 70, 88].
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